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The UN has not published any formal statement as to the legal framework governing 
peacekeepers’ use of force when they are not engaged as combatants in an armed conflict - but it 
has developed a working doctrine that it applies to all Chapter VII mandated missions regardless 
of whether they are deployed into situations of armed conflict or not. The doctrine, and its 
effects, are analysed here – drawing on interviews with UN Legal Officers; relevant UN and 
human rights documents; information learned in the course of field research on the impact of UN 
operations to combat criminal violence in Haiti. 
 
I. Introduction 
This article examines the approach taken by the United Nations to the use of deadly force by UN 
peacekeeping missions and assesses the extent to which the United Nations theoretical approach, 
and its practice in the field in the twenty-first century, complies with international legal standards 
protecting the right to life.  
The article focuses on peacekeeping missions mandated under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter (Chapter VII) but operating in situations where international humanitarian law (IHL) is 
not applicable. Under the Secretary General’s 1999 Bulletin on Observance by United Nations 
Forces of International Humanitarian Law UN peacekeepers must comply with at least the 
fundamental rules and principles of IHL set out in the Bulletin ‘when in situations of armed 
conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of 
their engagement.’1 
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The UN has not published any formal statement as to the legal framework governing 
peacekeepers’ use of force when they are not engaged as combatants in an armed conflict - but it 
has developed a working doctrine on use of force that it applies across the board to all Chapter 
VII mandated missions regardless of whether they are deployed into active situations of armed 
conflict or not. Because it has never been formally published, the United Nations doctrine on the 
legal framework governing peacekeepers’ use of deadly force when operating outside of a 
hostilities-in-armed-conflict context has not been subjected to rigorous analysis and critique in a 
public forum. The doctrine and its effects in practice, are analysed in the article below. The 
analysis is based on interviews with members of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs; 
relevant UN documents, particularly those relating to Rules of Engagement [ROE] for 
peacekeeping missions; and information learned in the course of field research in Haiti, where 
the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been engaged in law enforcement and 
humanitarian assistance for more than twelve years – during which time there has been no armed 
conflict as defined in international law.  MINUSTAH was mandated under Security Council 
resolution 1542 of 30 April 2004, which made no reference to armed conflict but noted 'the 
existence of challenges to the political, social and economic stability of Haiti and determin[ed] 
that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region.'2  Topping the list of MINUSTAH’ s mandated tasks was ‘in support of the Transitional 
Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and 
political process in Haiti can take place.’3 The Secretary-General’s report published the same 
month as S/RES 1542 was adopted, stated that ‘the greatest threat to security’ in Haiti came from 
‘community-organized armed groups’ that were ‘highly fragmented, located primarily in 
impoverished urban areas’ and relied on ‘banditry and other criminal activities in order to sustain 
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themselves.’4 MINUSTAH is credited with successfully reducing this ‘banditry’ through the use 
of highly militarized operations against criminal gangs in the period 2004 and 2007. But the 
death toll as result of MINUSTAH’s raids was high.5  
MINUSTAH stated, in response to a query by the then UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, that on one occasion in a night 
raid on July 6th 2005 to arrest ‘bandit’ leader Dred Wilme,6 MINUSTAH encountered heavy 
resistance from Wilme and his associates and so, in self-defense, they expended 22,700 
automatic firearm cartridges, 78 grenades, and 5 mortar shells - in a densely populated 
neighbourhood in which many of the houses were thin metal shacks.7 A cable from Douglas 
Griffiths, then Deputy US Ambassador to Haiti, said that ‘MINUSTAH was being accused of 
killing more than twenty women and children,’ statistics which his sources described as 
‘credible.’8 MINUSTAH conducted a similar raid on 22nd December 2006 (which it said was 
‘part of the strategy to fight crime and insecurity, seen in the recent wave of kidnappings in Port-
au-Prince’)9 and another on 7th February 2007. Both raids resulted in deaths – estimates vary but 
it seems likely that the death tolls were similar to that of the July 5th raid.10  
  Throughout this period MINUSTAH officials – including Juan Gabriel Valdès the 
UN Special Representative of the United Nations in Haiti from 2004 to 2006 and his successor 
Edmond Mulet - routinely referred to deaths and injuries caused to people that were not involved 
in crime as ‘collateral damage’11 a term traditionally reserved for situations of armed conflict. 
Under IHL foreseeable deaths and injuries to non-combatants are lawful provided that the 
victims were not directly targeted and provided that the ‘expected…incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof’  was not ‘ excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;’12 but under international 
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human rights law (IHRL), (which sets the standards for use of force outside of a hostilities-in-
armed-conflict context) use of force that is likely to result in deaths is only permitted where it 
is strictly necessary in order to protect life.13 
Civilian casualties on the scale that took place in Haiti as a direct result of use of force by 
peacekeepers are unusual, but the propensity for them to occur remains because ROE for 
peacekeeping missions have become dense, complex, and occasionally incoherent. They allow 
for use of deadly force in increasingly wider ranges of circumstances, in line with the broader 
more complex mandates, routinely adopted under Chapter VII, that have characterized UN 
peacekeeping since the late 1990s. This expansion in complexity, scale and preparedness to use 
force has not been matched by an equivalent level of attention to the legal frameworks that apply 
in these broadened circumstances - or to the obligations, particularly international human rights 
law obligations, that flow from them.  
 The research for this project was funded by two UK research councils – the 
British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Council.14 The applicability of IHRL in 
armed conflict is a topical issue and research on it has recently been undertaken by the 
International Law Association (ILA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and 
Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs:15 but none of these have undertaken the 
in-depth analysis of the United Nations approach to peacekeepers’ use of deadly force that this 
article offers.  
The article is set out in six further sections:  
2. Overview of the Argument 
3. The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
 4. Overview of the Relevant Legal Frameworks  
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5. The Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross and    Human 
Rights Organizations 
6. The Approach taken by the UN Office of Legal Affairs 
7. Conclusion  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT  
This paper argues that use of deadly force by UN police or military personnel when 
carrying out law enforcement operations must comply with customary international human rights 
law (IHRL) obligations protecting the right to life. That law enforcement operations are 
constrained by IHRL norms on use of force even in situations of armed conflict, and that IHRL 
prohibits use of deadly force except where it is necessary to protect life or to protect from serious 
injury, is not a controversial position. It is recognised by the United Nations itself in key 
documents16 and by former UN Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Christof Heyns and Philip Alston; 17 by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (which is the leading organization responsible for articulating and monitoring the legal 
obligations that apply in situations of armed conflict);18 by the International Law Association in 
various committee reports;19  and by leading experts in the laws applicable in armed conflicts - 
most succinctly in the Practitioners Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, co-written 
and co-edited  by Dapo Akande, Charles Garraway, Françoise Hampson, Noam Lubell, Daragh 
Murray and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, all internationally recognized experts in the field that between 
them have extensive military, foreign office, international court, NGO and academic 
experience.20  
However, although the ICRC, ILA, the UN Special Rapporteurs cited above, and the 
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Practitioners Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, all state that IHRL obligations on 
the right to life apply to all agencies carrying out law enforcement operations, including UN 
peacekeeping missions, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), and the 
UN Office of Legal Affairs, have not acknowledged that when UN peacekeeping missions use 
deadly force to carry out law enforcement tasks they must comply with customary international 
IHRL obligations protecting the right to life.  
The UN Office of Legal Affairs regards the mandate as the key factor governing use of 
deadly force and believes that pursuant to their mandate peacekeepers may use deadly force 
against anyone, whether or not they are parties to an armed conflict, provided that use of force 
for the purpose of carrying  out the mandated task is authorized by the Security Council 
resolution setting out the mandate; that use of deadly force is proportionate to achieving the 
objective authorized by the mandate; that minimum force is used and only as a last resort; and 
that use of deadly force is authorized by the mission’s Rules of Engagement (ROE).21 
 ROE for UN peacekeeping missions routinely prohibit use of weapons or methods 
of combat or warfare prohibited under IHL but there is no reference to peacekeepers obligations 
under IHRL in either the United Nations generic template for ROE or in mission specific ROE. 22 
Some of the specific authorizations set out in the ROE for missions deployed since 2000, are, 
prima facie at least, incompatible with customary IHRL obligations protecting the right to life.23 
To a limited degree this may also have been true of earlier missions, particularly in relation to 
use of deadly force to protect designated property, 24 but since the millennium the problem has 
become acute. Prior to the twenty-first century mission mandates generally did not authorize use 
of force to carry out tasks of a law enforcement nature and hence their ROE did not authorize it 
either. Today the situation is very different.  
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 Since 2000 the Security Council has frequently authorized use of force not only 
against parties to an armed conflict but also against groups deemed to pose a threat to peace and 
order ‘more generally.’25 Examples include the UN Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) which 
has been mandated since June 2015 (four years after the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire came to an 
end), to use ‘all necessary means’ to fulfil all of its complex mandate, which includes 
‘support[ing] the national authorities in stabilizing the security situation in the country;’26  and 
the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) which is mandated ‘to take all necessary means’ within its capabilities and areas of 
deployment, to inter alia ‘promote and support the rapid extension of State authority.’27 Ola 
Enghdahl (former legal advisor to the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and currently 
legal advisor to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) notes that the use of UN military forces 
for conducting traditional policing tasks has become ‘one of the ‘trademarks’ of peace 
operations.’28A detailed table of all current UN peacekeeping missions setting out the categories 
of tasks that they are mandated to carry out, is available from the UN website in an excel table.29  
Many of the categories listed in the table relate to law enforcement activities - for example 
fifteen missions are mandated to carry out Rule of Law tasks, fifteen to carry out tasks relating to 
Electoral Assistance, eleven to provide Support to State Institutions, and eleven to carry out 
Security Sector reforms.30 Most of these missions are mandated under Chapter VII and most are 
authorized to use force using the formula ‘all necessary means’ or ‘all necessary measures.’31 
‘All necessary means’ or ‘all necessary measures’ are euphemisms routinely used by the Security 
Council to authorize force.32 
Individuals and groups that are not parties to an armed conflict but  whose activities 
undermine peace and stability are categorized by the UN as ‘spoilers’ - defined in the UN 
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Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO)’s 2010 Draft Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping as 
‘those who seek to obstruct or derail the implementation of a mission mandate.’33 Emily Paddon 
Rhoads notes the ‘broadening of what constitutes spoiling activity to include, for example, 
domestic and transnational organized crime’ which she argues ‘further substantiates the parallel 
between contemporary peacekeeping and law enforcement.’ 34 This is particularly true of 
operations that have a stabilization component. Karlsrud defines stabilization as the use of 
‘military means to stabilize a country, sometimes with all necessary means to neutralize potential 
“spoilers.”’35  
Bellamy and Hunt argue that the tendency of twenty-first century UN missions to ‘move 
away from peacekeeping as an impartial overseer of peace processes towards the goal of 
stabilization’36 has brought about a significant increase in use of force since stabilization requires 
that ‘the use of force by UN peacekeepers moves from being a potential resource that might be 
used sparingly in response to unforeseen circumstances to a tool whose use is directly presaged 
by the mandate itself.’37 At the time of writing, four UN missions are explicitly mandated, under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as stabilization missions - the missions to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali and Haiti. 38 In addition to these, several 
missions that are not explicitly designated as stabilization missions are nevertheless mandated to 
carry out stabilization objectives. Examples include the UN Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL)39 and 
the UNOCI.40 The UN peacekeeping website lists ‘[s]upport for the restoration and extension of 
State authority’ as one of the activities in which ‘UN peacekeepers are often mandated to play a 
catalytic role.’41 Alongside this extension into stabilization the ‘UN is pushing hard to promote 
the concept of robust peacekeeping as a requirement for all peacekeepers.’42 This push towards 
increased and more intense use of force by peacekeepers, and the expansion of peacekeeping 
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activities to encompass stabilization, has not been matched by equivalent attention to the legal 
obligations relating to use of force outside of a hostilities-in-armed conflict context.  
The United Nations Capstone Doctrine, which sets out the Principles and Guidelines that 
should govern peacekeeping operations, states that: 
The environments into which United Nations peacekeeping operations are 
deployed are often characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and 
other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a 
threat to the civilian population. In such situations, the Security Council has given 
United Nations peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing them to 
“use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political 
process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist 
the national authorities in maintaining law and order.43  
The UN DPKO’s Draft Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping asserts that: 
Where a robust approach necessitates the use of force by peacekeeping operations, it is 
pursued on a case-by-case basis only, in full adherence to the operation’s mandate, its Rules of 
Engagement and Directives on Use of Force where applicable and the principles of UN 
peacekeeping, and in full compliance with the applicable humanitarian, human rights and refugee 
law.44 
However, neither humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, permit the use of deadly 
force against spoilers or criminals that are not parties to an armed conflict or civilians directly 
participating in one, in order to ‘deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process,’ or to 
‘assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order,’ two of the three example scenarios 
given in the Capstone Doctrine. So how should use of ‘all necessary means,’ be interpreted in 





THE UN STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH) 
The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti was deployed to provide security in the aftermath 
of the forced departure of former President Aristide in February 2004. The armed violence 
associated with the coup against Aristide lasted just three weeks and involved no more than three 
hundred armed men. It began as ‘a few isolated attacks on police posts, evolving into a small 
number of troops moving largely uncontested across the territory. They ultimately did not seek 
armed confrontation but rather fear and mobilization of masses.’45 It is possible that during those 
three weeks the situation in Haiti did meet the legal criteria for armed conflict; but if so any 
armed conflict was over by the time MINUSTAH deployed in June. However according to the 
International Crisis Group the situation ‘never escalated into an internal armed conflict’ and 
throughout the period of violence there were no ‘clearly identified parties to a conflict.’46  
 The ICRC, in its 26 February 2004 Bulletin (published three days before Aristide 
was taken to the Central African Republic) described the situation in Haiti as ‘armed violence’ 
rather than ‘armed conflict.’47 In a subsequent report on its role in providing assistance in 
situations of urban violence short of armed conflict, the ICRC made it clear that it did not 
consider the situation in Haiti during the period 2004 to 2007 to be one of armed conflict:’ 
Rio de Janeiro is not the only place where the ICRC has reacted to urban violence short 
of war. Between 2004 and 2007, after the ouster of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the 
ICRC and the Haitian National Red Cross Society came to the aid of victims of violence in Port-
au-Prince.…entering into discussions with gang leaders is not difficult, but the conversations will 
not be the same as with opposition groups fighting armed conflicts.48 
A 2009 report by the Center on International Cooperation states that in Haiti: 
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the most salient political violence of the past three decades has involved not well-
organized combat operations, but mobilization of crowds from among the millions of extremely 
poor, on short notice by murky political interests. Violent political activity often reflects 
intertwined criminal and political insecurity.49  
This case study was cited by the UN DPKO itself, in its report Second Generation 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Practices in UN Peacekeeping Operations.50 
The case study was also cited approvingly by Carlos Channos Vianna Braga, a Brazilian Navy 
Officer that served in Haiti as assistant to MINUSTAH’s first force commander, General 
Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira.51  
 MINUSTAH’s early operations were mainly to provide support to Haitian 
National Police (HNP) - which they provided despite allegations of serious human rights abuses 
committed by the HNP. Kofi-Annan, in his February 2005 report on Haiti, stated that he 
remained ‘concerned about the human rights situation, including allegations of human rights 
abuses attributed to HNP officers, which have not yet been properly investigated by the 
authorities.’52 A Security Council Mission visited Haiti in April 2005 and reported that it: 
received reports that a culture of impunity remained pervasive, marked by arbitrary 
arrest, wrongful detention, inhumane prison conditions, excessive use of force, and extrajudicial 
executions. As a result, the population continues to view the national police with fear and lack of 
respect. The mission learned that the commission that should investigate allegations against the 
police had yet to be established.53 
In August 2005 the HNP was accused of firing wantonly into a crowd of spectators at a 
football match.54 Thierry Fagart, who was chief of the Human Rights Section of MINUSTAH, 
estimated that at least nine people died.55 Philippe Branchat, an employee of the International 
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Organization for Migration, who managed the USAID-program that sponsored the soccer game, 
said that according to the information he got from his contacts this was ‘a planned aggression, an 
attack to destabilize the community.’56 In November 2005 Amnesty International called for an 
investigation into human rights violations by the HNP.57  
 In 2013 the UN adopted a Human Rights Due Diligence Policy that applies to all 
United Nations entities, which states that before UN forces give support to a host state an 
assessment of ‘the risk of the recipient entity committing grave violations of international 
humanitarian law, human rights law or refugee law’ must be made and ‘procedures for 
monitoring the recipient entity’s compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and 
refugee law’ must be established as part of an effective implementation framework.58 If ‘the 
United Nations receives reliable information that provides substantial grounds to suspect that the 
recipient entity’ is engaging in grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or 
refugee law, and continues to do so despite protests, then the United Nations entity must suspend 
or withdraw support from the recipient.59 In 2004 the UN did not have in place a formal policy 
prohibiting UN peacekeepers’ from providing support to governments that violate human rights 
– but that does not alter the fact that the UN has an obligation not to provide military support to 
governments that violate human rights, especially when it is of such a scale and seriousness as to 
warrant international concern, including by the UN Secretary-General and Security Council 
delegations.  
In 2009  the Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs and UN Legal Counsel, Patricia 
O’Brien, stated, in a note to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le 
Roy, that the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: 
may not lawfully provide logistics or ‘service’ support to any FARDC [Congolese armed 
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forces] operation if it has reason to believe that the FARDC units involved are in violation of any 
of those bodies of law [IHL, IHRL and international refugee law]…this follows from the 
Organization’s obligations under customary international law and from the Charter to uphold, 
promote and encourage respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee 
law. 60 
Ms O’Brien’s statement is cited in the commentary to Article 14 of the Draft Articles on 
the Responsibilities of International Organisations (DARIO) as an example of the kind of 
situation in which international organization might be held responsible for giving aid or 
assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.61 
 Researchers from Miami Law School described one of the UN raids in support of 
the HNP that they witnessed in the autumn of 2004:  
Before and during the HNP incursion, MINUSTAH soldiers in APCs rumbled at high 
speeds down streets crowded with women and children. The peacekeepers were positioned with 
their heads and shoulders poking out of the tanks, holding automatic rifles in the ready position 
aimed in all directions. Each APC had one soldier manning a large, fixed gun on top. The APCs 
blocked off roads surrounding the target neighborhood, preventing entry or exit by journalists, 
investigators and anyone else who was not a police officer or soldier.  Within seconds of the 
HNP incursion, gunfire began, and rattled sporadically for hours. When it ended, the forces 
cleared out… Dead bodies were on the street. One was a middle-aged woman who, residents 
stated, was unknown in the area but had been passing through during the attack. She was struck 
in the abdomen by gunfire, ran about 50 yards, and collapsed face first. 62 
The MINUSTAH supported HNP operations had limited success in improving security. 
By 2005 business leaders were complaining bitterly that MINUSTAH’s role in supporting the 
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HNP was not enough and MINUSTAH’s own reports state that it was being asked to be more 
proactive in putting to stop the ‘daily armed attacks against businesses’ lorries and buildings, 
pillaging, kidnapping of employees, that put into imminent peril the survival of the country’s 
only zone of economic activity.’63  Colonel Braga explained that in response to this pressure 
‘MINUSTAH began to adapt to the Haitian context and to Chapter VII rules of engagement, 
occasionally resorting to the intense use of force against illegal armed groups and other 
spoilers.’64   
 The first major operation by MINUSTAH on Site Solèy without the HNP present 
took place on July 6th 2005. 440 soldiers were deployed to carry out Operation Iron Fist 
supported by another 1000 stationed at the perimeter. 65 The total count of munitions used was: 
22.700 automatic firearm cartridges; 78 grenades of all models and 5 mortar shells.66 The raid 
began before dawn and lasted into the afternoon. MINUSTAH used armoured vehicles and 
shipping containers to barricade all the exits from the area.67 MINUSTAH did not bring medical 
units with them to assist with civilian casualties, nor did it provide transport to the hospitals, or 
take steps prior to the raid to ensure that the hospitals would be in a position to treat so many 
trauma victims.68  
 A cable from the US Ambassador to Haiti, James Foley, stated that ‘[a]s the 
operation was a raid, MINUSTAH did not remain in the area to do an assessment of civilian or 
gang member casualties’ 69 but because of ‘the flimsy construction of homes in Cité Soleil and 
the large quantity of ammunition expended, it is likely that rounds penetrated many buildings, 
striking unintended targets.’70 Douglas Griffiths, then Deputy US Ambassador to Haiti, reported 
that allegations that MINUSTAH had killed twenty women and children were ‘credible.’71 On 
July 29th the Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, admitted that: 
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A number of operations have been conducted by MINUSTAH and it is not easy for 
MINUSTAH to conduct these operations because, operating in an urban environment, ideally 
you need the kind of very specialized capabilities that the mission doesn’t really have. But the 
security situation needs to be addressed urgently…I have to be honest with you, there may have 
been some civilian casualties.72  
The somewhat vague admission that ‘there may have been some civilian casualties’ 
suggests that at this point in time, three weeks after the raid, despite the acknowledgement that 
MINUSTAH did not have the ‘specialized capabilities’ needed for this type of operation, the UN 
had not yet undertaken a thorough investigation. A US Labor and Human Rights Delegation that 
visited Site Solèy and local hospitals twice in the three days following the raid, reported that they 
could find no evidence that anyone from MINUSTAH had visited the neighborhood or hospitals 
during those three days.73 Survivors of the raid interviewed in 2016 stated that no one from 
MINUSTAH has ever visited them to investigate the injuries and damage done, and never visited 
after any of the subsequent operations against the gangs.74  
An outcry over the casualties from Operation Iron Fist, and the resignation of General 
Heleno,75 led to a pause in operations. But on 6 January 2006 MINUSTAH’s civilian head of 
mission, Juan Gabriel Valdès, said that UN troops would soon ‘occupy’ Site Solèy: ‘We are 
going to intervene in the coming days…I think there'll be collateral damage but we have to 
impose our force, there is no other way.’ 76 The next day the force commander, General Bacellar, 
was found shot dead, reportedly from suicide; he had apparently refused to agree to the plan to 
‘occupy’ Site Solèy because too many people would be killed.77 After Bacellar’s death there was 
again a pause in operations against the gangs but these resumed in December 2006 with at least 
fourteen major raids in four months: 
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The operation on 28 December was called Happy New Year. This is not the only example 
of language that suggests a hostile view of the residents of poor communities in Haiti. A 2007 
report by a subcommittee of the US Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 
entitled UN Peacekeeping Forces: A Force Multiplier for the US? stated that MINUSTAH was 
eight times cheaper than keeping US troops in Haiti and that ‘without the United Nations’ 
presence…we would have witnessed an orgy of violence on that tragic island.’79 Leak argues 
that amongst some commentators there is a tendency to use exoticizing and demonizing language 
when talking about Haiti.80 Pangchang records how in 2011 one NGO official when questioned 
as to the decision to stop distribution of free water to the camps for displaced people, responded 
that Haitians were ‘genetically strong’ as a result of the ‘horrendous conditions’ such as ‘slavery 
and torture’ that they had endured and therefore could live in camps where ‘you or I would not 
survive one month.81 Ricardo Seitenfus, who was the special representative for the Organization 
of American States in Haiti from 2008-2010, believes that the poor communication between 
MINUSTAH and local residents (an inevitable consequence of the language barrier) was 
compounded by the fact that ‘in the eyes of MINUSTAH’ simply living in Site Solèy was 
enough to render a person ‘suspicious.’82  
Dorn describes how in planning and conducting the raids into Site Solèy MINUSTAH 
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‘deliberately sought to draw fire from the gangs by establishing ‘Strong Points’ in their 
territories, knowing that the gangsters’ pride would force them to retaliate, thus allowing the 
United Nations to return fire from relatively safe positions.’83 Deliberately drawing fire in 
densely populated neighbourhoods creates a high risk of casualties, as MINUSTAH must have 
been well aware. MINUSTAH commanders and legal advisors must also have been aware of the 
human right implications of their operations since it was widely discussed in the press, on 
television and on the radio. For example, on January 9th 2006, Dr. Reginald Boulos, president of 
the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and Industry berated MINUSTAH on Radio Metropole 
saying: 
we really do not care about what certain international human-rights-defense groups may 
say… I do not want anybody to tell me that because there is pressure at the international level, 
the authorities here should not fulfil their duty, that they should not do what is required of them. 
If they are afraid of what these international human-rights groups may say, then they do not have 
a place in the political leadership of MINUSTAH in this country… 
 You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. We think that 
MINUSTAH’s generals need to make plans to limit collateral damage. But we in the private 
sector are ready to create a social assistance fund to help all those who would be innocent 
victims of a necessary and courageous action that should be carried out in Cité Soleil.84 
Residents of Site Solèy, interviewed in 2016 for this research project about 
MINUSTAH’s operations in the period 2004-2007, said that they are certain that their loved ones 
were shot by MINUSTAH and not gang members because they were hit by bullets fired from 
UN helicopters that pierced the metal rooves of their houses (the holes have since been repaired 
but are still visible) and the gangs do not have helicopters.85 Other said that their relatives were 
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hit by ‘cannon fire’ from armoured vehicles and that the bullets that killed them were too large 
for Haitian weapons and the injuries too severe to have been made by an ordinary gun.86 Several 
residents said that they saw and heard MINUSTAH firing from the armored vehicles that they 
could see parked up behind their houses ‘so many you could not see past them’ and that the 
firing continued for several hours after the ‘bandits’ had left the area.87 They said that scores of 
houses and their entire contents were completely destroyed, saucepans ‘melted into one,’ and a 
child burned to death inside one of them.88 The residents pointed out where their houses had 
stood - pointing to the foundations and bits of their houses that remained. 89 Their testimonies are 
confirmed by doctors that were working with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) at the time90 and are also 
consistent with investigations conducted between 2004 and 2007 by Harvard Law School,91 
Miami Law School,92 a human rights organization Haiti Lamp,93 and a US Labor and Human 
Rights Delegation.94 
 Not all the victims died immediately. The parents of a ten-year old girl shot by 
helicopter when she was in bed stated that their daughter died four months after she had been 
shot. They did not have the money to obtain the medical care she needed. Another man related 
that his brother (a father of four children) was shot in the eye but the local clinic was unable to 
remove the bullet: the brother’s employer paid for his treatment in the Dominican Republic but 
the process of raising the money and getting him there took several months during which time 
the brother’s health deteriorated and he was left brain damaged.95 
 From the perspective of the UN, MINUSTAH’s operations against the gangs are 
seen as successful, indeed a potential blue-print for future operations against gangs and other 
spoilers that violently oppose stabilization.96 Interviews with residents of Site Solèy, present a 
very different perspective.97 As one interviewee put it ‘a massacre takes place in an area and no 
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one comes to find out how many victims there were, or how many people were lost, how many 
cases there are. (Pause) You know what you know, it stays with you.’98  
 
OVERVIEW OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
Peacekeepers may always use force, up to an including deadly force, in self-defence of 
themselves and their unit or other units in the mission, and also to protect civilians from violent 
attacks, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, provided that the force is necessary 
and proportionate to the aim of protecting life.99 Whether peacekeepers may use force for other 
purposes depends in part on the terms of their mandate, and also on compliance with any 
applicable IHRL and IHL obligations.   
 Since 1945 use of force at the inter-state level has largely been governed by the 
UN Charter which ‘prohibits the use of force in the relations between States, except in cases of 
self defence or collective security.’100 Chapter VII of the Charter gives the Security Council 
power to authorize enforcement action in response to threats to international peace and security. 
For much of the twentieth century the Security Council’s enforcement action powers were 
mainly directed against states that attacked or threatened other states. But in the 1990s UN 
peacekeeping missions came under severe criticism for failing to intervene to protect people 
from genocide and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since this 
failure was thought to be at least partly attributable to uncertainty as to the scope of 
peacekeepers’ authority to use force against the host state101 the Security Council responded by 
establishing a practice of adopting peacekeeping mandates under Chapter VII and authorizing 
peacekeeping missions to use ‘all necessary means,’ i.e. force, to carry out all or part of their 
mandate.  
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 The ‘all necessary means’ formula although common is not an essential 
component of an authorization to use force.102 Resolution 1509, establishing the UN Mission in 
Liberia, did not include the phrase ‘all necessary means/measures’ or any similar equivalent, 
however, the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat advised that: 
the absence of the phrase was not critical, since an authorization to use force depends 
upon the interpretation of the resolution, specifically, on the ordinary and natural meaning which 
is to be given to its terms when they are read in the context of the resolution as a whole and in 
the light of its object and purpose, and against the background of the discussions leading to, and 
the circumstances of, its adoption, in particular the report that the Secretary-General submitted 
pursuant to resolution 1497 (2003).103  
The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti is another example of a mission that was not 
mandated explicitly to use ‘all necessary means’ but the authority to use force was determined 
from the text of the resolution and associated UN documents, and was then reflected in the 
mission’s ROE.104   
 The international law regimes governing use of force at the tactical level - that is 
against people and objects as distinct from use of force ‘in the relations between states’105 - are 
principally IHRL, which is relevant at all times but may apply differently during hostilities, and 
IHL which applies only in situations that meet the legal criteria for armed conflict. The 1977 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts distinguishes armed conflict from ‘situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other 
acts of a similar nature.’106 Although there is no definition of armed conflict in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, the ICRC’s 2016 commentary states that: 
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the qualification of ‘internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature’ in Article 1 of Additional Protocol II 
as ‘not being armed conflicts’ is also considered accurate for common Article 3.107 
 In the view of the ILA International Law Association (ILA) committee on The Meaning 
of Armed Conflict in International Law, the reason that armed conflict must distinguished from 
internal disturbances, riots, banditry, short-lived insurrections, terrorist activities, and civil 
unrest108 is because in an armed conflict ‘states have expanded rights to kill without warning, 
detain without trial, and suspend or derogate from treaties and other obligations. Individuals may 
have their right to life, their right to a trial, and other important rights circumscribed.’109 In 
addition in an armed conflict ‘states that provide asylum to persons fleeing the violence of armed 
conflict will have the duty to do so; treaty obligations may be implicated; the law of neutrality 
may be triggered; arms control agreements are affected.’ 110 Moreover ‘United Nations forces 
engaged in armed conflict will have rights and duties not applicable in operations outside of 
armed conflict.’111  
 The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia has ruled that ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a state.’112 The ILA report on The Meaning of 
Armed Conflict in International Law concludes, following a detailed analysis of treaty and 
customary IHL, that at a minimum, ‘as a matter of customary international law, for a situation of 
armed violence to meet the legal criteria for armed conflict it must involve organized armed 
groups engaged in fighting of some intensity.’113 The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities in International Humanitarian Law states that for an 
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armed group to be classified as a party to an armed conflict it must have developed ‘a sufficient 
degree of military organization to conduct hostilities on behalf of a party to the conflict, albeit 
not always with the same means, intensity and level of sophistication as state armed forces.’114   
 Under the terms of the Bulletin on Observance by United Nations Forces of 
International Humanitarian Law promulgated by the Secretary-General in 1999, IHL will apply 
to peacekeepers that are ‘actively engaged as combatants’ in a situation of armed conflict.115 The 
intensity threshold for meeting this criterion is high and therefore, for most missions, even those 
deployed into situations of armed conflict, IHL applies only in exceptional circumstances.116 
Moreover even where the intensity threshold is met and peacekeepers find themselves engaged 
in fierce fighting, IHL will not become applicable unless the fighting takes place in a situation of 
armed conflict against members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict or civilians directly 
participating in the conflict. This is because ‘lawful use of armed force’ against people that are 
not directly participating in an armed conflict (e.g. criminals, rioters, civilian perpetrators of war 
crimes) is ‘a matter of law enforcement or defence of self or others’ and hence is not governed 
by IHL.117  
  Although IHL is not formally applicable outside of armed conflict 
contexts, military forces deployed overseas in law enforcement and stabilization operations will 
often employ the non-offensive aspects of IHL as a matter of policy because this is the legal 
regime in which military forces are trained and therefore the humanitarian and civil aspects of 
IHL are often ‘a sensible place to start in terms of adapting to local conditions.’118 But the 
offensive aspects of IHL cannot be applied outside of an armed conflict context because IHL 
permits members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict to target the armed forces of the 
enemy, with deadly force, on the basis of their status as combatants in the conflict without regard 
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to whether or not they pose an imminent threat.119 Under IHL people that do not belong to the 
armed forces of a party to the conflict may only be targeted if they are directly participating in 
hostilities and only whilst they are directly participating in hostilities.120   
  According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities in International Humanitarian Law, in order to for an act by a 
civilian to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, it must meet the following cumulative 
criteria:   
(1) The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity 
of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons 
or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm), and   
(2) there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either 
from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral 
part (direct causation), and   
(3) the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm 
in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).121 
In the view of the ICRC even ‘the perpetration of war crimes or other violations of IHL’ 
does not constitute direct participation in hostilities. 122 Such conduct may ‘permit the lawful use 
of armed force against the perpetrators as a matter of law enforcement or defence of self or 
others’ but ‘[l]oss of protection against direct attack within the meaning of IHL is not a sanction 
for criminal behavior.’123  
 It is not unusual for UN peacekeeping missions to be operating in situations that 
do not meet the criteria for armed conflict and to be engaged in operations designed to curb 
violent activity by people that are not members of an armed group that is party to an armed 
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conflict, and are not civilians directly participating in an armed conflict. Peacekeeping missions 
often remain deployed long after the conflict in the host state that triggered their initial 
deployment has ended e.g. the UN Missions to Liberia (UNMIL) and Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) 
and East Timor (UNTAET). Sometimes missions are deployed to respond to situations of civil 
unrest that never reached the threshold of armed conflict in the first place, for example the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).124 Other missions may be deployed in countries 
where there is an armed conflict but some of the tasks that they are mandated to carry out may be 
unconnected with the hostilities. Examples include MINURCAT, mandated ‘to take all necessary 
means’ to inter alia ‘promote and support the rapid extension of State authority’125 and the 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) which is mandated to, inter 
alia, support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish State administration 
throughout the country and support the organization and conduct of presidential and legislative 
elections.126 In order to carry out these kinds of tasks peacekeepers must interact with people that 
are not participants in an armed conflict. Some of them may be criminals with no political 
allegiances other than pragmatic ones. Some of them may be political activists opposed to the 
government or to the presence of the UN mission. Some of them, whether for pragmatic reasons 
or for political reasons, may forcefully seek to prevent the UN mission from achieving its goals: 
‘spoilers’ in the nomenclature of the UN.   
 
VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS - INCLUDING RELEVANT SECTORS OF THE UN                                            
The view of the ICRC, expressed in its 2015 guidance on Violence and the Use of Force, 
is that: 
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In a peace support operation, as in any other, the legal nature of the situation in which the 
force is deployed determines the legal framework and rules to be respected. In this regard, the 
mandate, rules of engagement (setting out applicable rules, in particular for the use of force) and 
status of force agreements (governing the legal status of foreign troops in relation to a host 
nation) are only indicative.127 
The ICRC guidance goes on to state that when peacekeepers use force the ‘same rules 
then apply as for other operations depending on the situation’s legal categorization.’128 The 
Practitioner’s Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, co-published by Chatham House 
Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press, expresses the same view. It states 
that although the circumstances in which a peace support operation may use force is subject to 
the terms of its mandate, this does not affect the applicable legal framework ‘which is 
determined in the same manner as for all other military operations.’ 129 Moreover the ‘terms of 
the Security Council resolution giving the mandate to the PSO [peace support operation], even if 
force is authorized, are not determinative of whether or not there is an armed conflict.’130    
 The basic principle that all human beings have a right to life is a peremptory norm 
and it is widely accepted that peremptory norms do bind the UN.131 The exact scope of the 
peremptory norm aspect of the right to life is an ongoing subject of debate but at its core is the 
rule that, outside of armed conflict, targeting an individual with deadly force is only permissible 
where there is a threat to someone’s life or a threat of serious injury, and there is no other means 
of protecting them.132 The Bulletin on Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1990, prohibits use of 
deadly force except when it is ‘strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.’133 The Bulletin also 
states that ‘[e]xceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public 
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emergency may not be invoked to justify any departure from these basic principles.’134 The 
former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (2010-2016), 
Christof Heyns, asserts that the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials135 and the Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials ‘are widely accepted 
as authoritative statements of the law.’136   
 The ICRC report on Violence and the Use of Force states that when armed forces, 
including peacekeepers, are engaged in a law enforcement task ‘intentional lethal use of firearms 
may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.’137 The majority of experts 
attending the ICRC’s 2012 conference Use of Force in Armed Conflicts similarly concluded that, 
even in an armed conflict, when troops are carrying out law enforcement operations deadly force 
‘may be used only as last resort in order to protect life, when other available means remain 
ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.’138 
 In his 2014 report as Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killing, Christof Heyns 
reviewed the international law on the right to life relevant to use of force and concluded that 
under generally applicable international law, even when police or troops are acting in response to 
a public emergency (except when they are using force ‘in the conduct of hostilities in armed 
conflict’),139 ‘the only objective that can be legitimate when lethal force is used is to save the life 
of a person or to protect a person from serious injury.’140 In Heyns’ view, the obligation on law 
enforcement officers to comply with international law standards on the right to life also applies 
to United Nations peacekeeping troops.141 Philip Alston, who was Heyns’ predecessor as Special 
Rapporteur shares this view. In 2005 he stated that the planning and execution of law 
enforcement operations by UN peacekeepers must be guided by the Basic Principles on the Use 
of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’142 that and ‘[i]n any event, intentional 
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deadly use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.’143 
Alston reiterated this opinion in an interview in December 2016, in which acknowledged that 
gang violence, in particular, posed serious challengers for law enforcement officers, including 
peacekeepers, but stressed that nevertheless the applicable regime governing such situations is 
IHRL.144  
 The Practitioner’s Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict states that 
‘unless the PSO is a party to an armed conflict, even situations in which violence is directed 
against the force, and situations in which the force takes action in self-defence, are governed by 
international human rights law’145 and that under IHRL  the only justification for resort to deadly 
force by armed forces, including peacekeeping forces, ‘must be a real and immediate danger to 
life or limb.’146  Further, the operation ‘must be designed to protect life including the life of the 
persons presenting the threat’ and any use of force must be the minimum necessary and must be 
‘proportionate to the aim of protecting life.’147 
 
THE APPROACH TAKEN BY THE UN OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS  
Interviewed in June 2016, a legal advisor with many years’ service in the UN Office of 
Legal Affairs, stated, and subsequently confirmed in writing by email, that under the United 
Nations current approach the mandate is the key factor that determines the circumstances in 
which peacekeepers can use deadly force and that:  
A person that would not be a military target under traditional IHL may become an 
authorized military target of a UN peacekeeping operation (and therefore killed) provided that: 
the peacekeepers’ use of force is pursuant to an authorization in a Chapter VII mandate and is 
provided for in the mission’s rule of engagement; that the use of force is proportionate to 
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achieving the authorized objective; that minimum force is used; and that force is used only as a 
last resort. This framework applies across the board to all UN peacekeeping missions, regardless 
of whether the situation is one of armed conflict or not.148 
However, she stressed that whilst the summary above ‘fully captures our discussion:’ 
The only amplification is that while the authority to use force comes from the Security 
Council based on the specific mandate and the Chapter VII authority to use ‘all necessary means’ 
as reflected in the mission-specific ROE - not from IHL except where the mission becomes a 
party to the conflict or from IHRL - the customary principles of both IHL and IHRL are 
nonetheless integral to the conduct of the mission including its military component. 149 
In a separate interview another senior advisor in the UN Office of Legal Affairs 
explained the United Nations doctrine in very similar terms.150 The views stated above were 
expressed in the context of interviews and therefore have not gone through the rigorous process 
of analysis and checks for detail, nuances, and unintended implications, that would have to be 
done before producing a public bulletin; and therefore they cannot be treated as authoritative.151 
Nevertheless the core of the argument is an accurate reflection of the stance taken by the UN 
Office of Legal Affairs: the two Legal Officers’ had the same view on the legal rules governing 
use of force by UN peacekeepers and this view was also confirmed by Legal Officers and 
Military Advisors attending a follow-up seminar meeting on the issue.1 There was a clear 
consensus at that meeting (which was attended by approximately twenty people) that the content 
of the United Nations doctrine on use of force is as described above.  
Although ‘the customary principles of both IHL and IHRL are ...integral to the conduct’ 
of UN peacekeeping missions it is difficult to see how customary IHRL obligations regarding the 
right to life can be properly applied and upheld if the UN does not explicitly affirm that 
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peacekeepers must adhere to IHRL standards on the right to life in all law enforcement 
operations152 and does not require missions to distinguish between use of deadly force against 
combatants and use of deadly force against criminals, rioters and other ‘spoilers.’ The Chatham 
House Practitioners’ Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict states that when carrying 
out law enforcement operations, as distinct from hostilities operations, any use of deadly force by 
armed forces, including peacekeepers, ‘must be proportionate to the aim of protecting life.’153 
This contrasts with the UN formulation of proportionality as stated on its own website: 
A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort. It should 
always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of 
the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the 
mission and its mandate.154 
A UN Master List of Rules of Engagement and Sample ROE were set out in the UN 
Guidelines for the Development of Rules of Engagement, approved in 2000 by Jean-Marie 
Guehenno, then Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The Guidelines set out the 
procedure and basic legal framework for drafting ROE.155 The principles of minimum force and 
proportionality as set out in these guidelines and standardly in UN ROE for peacekeeping 
missions, require that: 
Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to 
achieve the authorized objective. In some circumstances, operational urgency may dictate that 
immediate use of deadly force may be necessary for this purpose.  
The use of force must be commensurate with the level of the threat. However, the level of 
force that is used may have to be higher than the level of the threat in order to avoid or minimise 
UN or civilian casualties, or, in the case of offensive action, to ensure that the authorized 
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objective is achieved.  
Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the use of alternatives to the use of 
physical force, such as deception, psychological methods, negotiation, and other non-lethal 
means, including the deployment or manoeuvre of larger forces in order to demonstrate 
resolve.156  
This is a very different standard of proportionality to the IHRL standard which requires 
use of deadly force to be proportionate to the aim of protecting life. Given the very broad 
mandates, and routine authorization to use ‘all necessary means’ that characterise modern 
peacekeeping, this is a critical difference that has significant implications for host state 
communities living in the vicinity of UN operations.  
 
UN Rules of Engagement for Peacekeeping Missions 
The Sample ROE were set out in the UN Guidelines for the Development of Rules of 
Engagement, approved in 2000 by Jean-Marie Guehenno, consists of eleven suggested rules: 
Rule 1.1 Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to defend oneself and other UN 
personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent is authorized.  
Rule 1.2 Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to defend other international 
personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent is authorised.  
Rule 1.3 Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to resist attempts to abduct or 
detain oneself and other UN personnel is authorised.  
Rule 1.4 Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to resist attempts to abduct or 
detain other international personnel is authorised.  
Rule 1.5 Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to protect United Nations’ 
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installations, areas or goods, designated by the Head of Mission in consultation with the Force 
Commander, against a hostile act, is authorised.  
Rule 1.6 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect key installations, areas 
or goods designated by the Head of Mission in consultation with the Force Commander, against 
a hostile act is authorised.  
OR 
Rule 1.7 Use of force, up to but excluding deadly force, to protect key installations, areas 
or goods designated by the Head of Mission in consultation with the Force Commander, against 
a hostile act is authorised.  
Rule 1.8 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to defend any person who is in 
need of protection against a hostile act or hostile intent, when competent local authorities are not 
in a position to render immediate assistance is authorized. When and where possible, permission 
to use force should be sought from the immediate superior. 
Rule 1.9 Use of force, to prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, 
pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities, is authorized. In case of necessity to act in 
self-defence use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized.  
Rule 1.10 Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, against any individual and/or 
party who limits or intends to limit freedom of movement, is authorised.157  
Rule 1.11 Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to resist armed forceful 
attempts to prevent peacekeepers from discharging their duties is authorized.158  
These Guidelines and Sample ROE are provided to Troop Contributing States for use in 
training of their troops. They provide a template for drafting mission specific ROE but they do 
not restrict expansion beyond the suggestions in the template if the drafters of the ROE believe 
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that the mandate requires it.  
  Troop contributing states may, and often do, introduce caveats narrowing the 
ROE as applied to their troop contribution - usually in order to comply with their own domestic 
laws or to avoid becoming drawn into an armed conflict. Commander Dale Stephens, writing 
about his experiences whilst serving with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET), commented that the ‘UNTAET ROE were expressed broadly and, prima facie, did 
permit the use of force in order to perform necessary duties, though this was necessarily ‘read 
down’ to permit lethal force only in situations where lives were directly threatened.’159 
UNTAET’s numbered ROE on use of force,160 which Commander Stephens considered to have 
been ‘expressed broadly,’ were almost identical to those set out in the Sample UN Rules of 
Engagement annexed to the UN Guidelines for the Development of Rules of Engagement 2000. 
In the intervening six years, ROE have diverged significantly from the UN sample rules 
approved by Guehenno in 2000 and are much broader than the UNTAET ROE that Commander 
Stephens thought were ‘expressed broadly’ and therefore needed to be read down. 
As an illustration of the kind of potential problems arising from robust mandates and the 
lack of clarity as to the applicable law governing use of force by peacekeepers, it is worth 
looking at a draft for a Soldiers’ Blue Card drawn up for troops serving with the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). 
Soldier’s Cards are issued to individual troop members to serve as a guide and are intended to be 
short and clear enough to be understood by soldiers of all ranks and experiences. A draft version 
of the Blue Card for MINUSCA, dated August 2014, authorizes the soldier to use force ‘up to 
and including deadly force’ in a number of listed circumstances including to: 
support the Transitional Authorities in the rapid extension of State authority 
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and  
to support urgent temporary measures adopted by MINUSCA in line with its mandate to 
maintain basic law and order and fight impunity.161 
There is no equivalent to these rules in Guehenno’s Sample ROE. Both rules appear to 
relate to law enforcement tasks, especially the second one authorizing use of deadly force ‘to 
maintain basic law and order.’ These seemingly broad authorizations to use deadly force are 
qualified by an instruction set out in a separate section of the Blue Card entitled Firing Rules, 
which states that ‘If you have to open fire:’ 
Use deadly force to protect UN personnel and civilians only when there is a grave threat 
to life or threat of abduction, detention or serious bodily injury and when other means, including 
non-deadly force, do not hold out any promise of removing that threat.162 
The main text of MINUSCA’s draft ROE contains all the rules set out on the Blue Card 
but also states that: 
 [e]verything feasible must be done to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects, but are military objectives within the meaning of these terms under 
the law of armed conflict.163  
MINUSCA’S rules limiting deadly force to situations where there is a grave threat to life, 
abduction or detention, and requiring compliance with the principle of distinction appear to be 
incompatible, prima facie, with the rules in the Numbered ROE for MINUSCA and the Soldier’s 
Blue Card authorizing use of force, up to and including deadly force, to carry out law 
enforcement tasks. Presumably this apparent incompatibility was clarified in training - or in 
revisions to the documents before the ROE and Soldier’s Card were issued.164 But the fact that 
authorizations for use of deadly force that are so complex as to require clarification suggests that 
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even within the UN there is a lack of consensus as to the circumstances in which deadly force 
may be used to carry out law enforcement tasks. There is no reference to IHRL in either the main 
text of the ROE or the Blue Card despite the fact that the draft ROE explicitly authorize use of 
deadly force ‘to maintain basic law and order.’ 
 The most plausible explanation for including numbered ROE authorizing use of 
deadly force to ‘promote and support the rapid extension of State authority’ and ‘to support 
urgent temporary measures adopted by MINUSCA in line with its mandate to maintain basic law 
and order and fight impunity’ is the need to ensure that ROE cover all situations for which troops 
have a mandate to act. Security Council Resolution 2149 authorizes MINUSCA ‘to take all 
necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment’ and 
authorizes it inter alia to ‘promote and support the rapid extension of State authority’ and to 
‘adopt urgent temporary measures on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent and 
without prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping operations... to maintain basic law 
and order and fight impunity.’165  
The relationship between the mandating resolution and ROE is not always as direct as in 
the MINUSCA example above. The ROE templates set out in the UN Master Lists of 2000 and 
2002 contain no rule for use of deadly force in response to civil unrest. However MINUSTAH’s 
ROE explicitly authorizes the mission to use force, ‘up to and including deadly force in order to 
put a stop to acts of civil unrest.’166 MINUSTAH’s mandate does not refer to civil unrest: it does 
state that the mission is mandated ‘in support of the Transitional Government, to ensure a secure 
and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take 
place.’167 This provision is the first one in the list of mandated tasks - which suggests that the 
Council considered this to be one of the primary tasks of the mission. Presumably it is this 
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provision that provides the basis for the authorization in MINUSTAH’s ROE to use deadly force 
in response to civil unrest.168  
The provision in MINUSTAH’s ROE for dealing with civil unrest contrasts with a 
similar provision in the ROE drawn up in 2009 for use by the UN Mission in the Central African 
Republic (MINURCAT), which authorized use of force, ‘up to and including deadly force to 
prevent or put a stop to acts of civil unrest that are a threat to life or of serious bodily injury.’169 
Civil unrest is defined in both MINUSTAH’s and MINURCAT’s ROE as ‘the commission, 
perpetration, or instigation of acts of violence that effect public peace and order.’170 
MINURCAT’s ROE on civil unrest is in line with human rights law standards but arguably that 
for MINUSTAH is not. Neither sets of ROE make any reference whatsoever to IHRL.  
It is not just the numbered ROE setting out the circumstances in which deadly force may 
be used, that are of concern. The sections in mission ROE dealing with permissible Weapon 
States also raise questions with regard to compatibility with IHRL. For example, under 
MINUSTAH’s ROE the Force Commander may authorize ‘as he believes operationally 
appropriate,’ without need for consultation with UN headquarters, that: 
Helicopter-mounted guns and missiles may be deployed. Guns may have a loaded 
magazine or belted ammunition inserted in or attached to the weapon. They may be cocked and 
ammunition inserted into the breach and fired. Missiles may be prepared for immediate firing.171   
Given that MINUSTAH’s mandating resolution and relevant Secretary-General’s reports 
confirmed that the main problem in Haiti was not armed conflict but ‘the existence of challenges 
to the political, social and economic stability of Haiti’ - and that the main source of armed 
violence were the gangs based in Site Solèy and similarly impoverished densely populated 
neighbourhoods – an authorization to use helicopter mounted guns and missiles without the need 
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for further consultation or higher authorization,  seems extraordinary.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
The United Nations Human Rights Up Front initiative, adopted in 2014, commits the UN 
to entrenching human rights norms into all aspects of its missions. Although it ‘is designed 
primarily for settings where the UN does not have a political or peacekeeping mission’ the 
Secretary-General’s 2014 Aide Memoire to the plan states that ‘its spirit can and should also be 
applied to “mission settings.” 172 The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations has 
recommended that the ‘entire United Nations system commits to the full implementation of the 
Human Rights Up Front initiative.’173  
 IHRL requires that any operation using deadly force, outside of a hostilities 
operation ‘must be designed to protect life including the life of the persons presenting the threat’ 
and any use of force must be the minimum necessary to protect life and must be ‘proportionate to 
the aim of protecting life.’174 Because there is no reference to IHRL standards on use of force in 
UN ROE it is left up to troop contributing states to ensure compliance with them, for example 
through the adoption of caveats or through a process of ‘reading down’ authorizations to a level 
that complies with their domestic laws. The likely consequence is that some troop contributing 
states will apply an IHRL standard but others will not.  
 The UN Secretariat should draft a formal Bulletin setting out the IHRL 
obligations of UN peacekeepers with regard to use of deadly force against persons that are not 
parties to an armed conflict. ROE should clearly distinguish between hostilities operations and 
law enforcement operations and make clear that outside of hostilities use of deadly force may 
only be used to protect life and its use must be proportionate to the aim of protecting life. The 
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UN should also ensure that, when it deploys a mission with a mandate to use force in a broad 
range of circumstances, the mission is equipped with the personnel and resources to ensure that 
civilians affected by its operations receive appropriate post-operation care and support, including 
medical care that is of a standard commensurate with the status, principles and ideals of the UN. 
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 An independent inquiry should be undertaken into the deaths, injuries and 
destruction to homes that occurred as result of UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti in the period 
2004-2007. There is strong evidence from testimonials, photographs and film footage; from the 
kind of injuries inflicted; from bullet holes in the roofs of some houses and the total levelling of 
other houses; from the bullets collected (many of which are marked as made in Brazil and are too 
large to be from an ordinary weapon) - that MINUSTAH fired from heavy fixed guns mounted 
on armoured vehicles and fired from helicopters. The UN itself has recognized that ‘there may 
have been some civilian casualties’176 as a result of MINUSTAH’s use of force on July 6th 2005 
given the scale of the operation and the fact that the neighborhood is densely populated and 
many people live in thin corrugated metal houses. There were at least fourteen other major raids 
in the period 2004-2007 in which casualties are likely to have occurred for the same reasons. 
This warrants an investigation, established with the authority of the UN, but carried out by a 
highly qualified international investigative team that is independent of any person or 
organization that has been involved in the mission. 
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